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Abstract
Background: Research into personal health data holds great potential not only for improved treatment but also for
economic growth. In these years many countries are developing policies aimed at facilitating such research often
under the banner of ‘big data’. A central point of debate is whether the secondary use of health data requires
informed consent if the data is anonymised. In 2013 the Danish Minister of Health established a new register
collecting data about all ritual male childhood circumcisions in Denmark. The main purpose of the register was to
enable future research into the consequences of ritual circumcision.
Discussion: This article is a study into the case of the Danish Circumcision Registry. We show that such a registry
may lead to various forms of harm such as 1) overreaching social pressure, 2) stigmatization, 3) medicalization of a
religious practice, 4) discrimination, and 5) polarised research, and that a person may therefore have a strong and
legitimate interest in deciding whether or not such data should be collected and/or used in research. This casts
doubt on the claim that the requirement of informed consent could and should be waived for all types of
secondary research into registries. We finally sketch a new model of informed consent – Meta consent – aimed at
striking a balance between the interests in promoting research and at the same time protecting the individual.
Summary: Research participants may have a strong and legitimate interest in deciding whether or not their data
should be collected and used for registry-based research whether or not their data is anonymised.
Keywords: Informed consent, Social pressure, Stigmatization, Medicalization, Discrimination, Polarisation, Health
data, Religious circumcision, Meta consent
Background
The secondary use of health data and informed consent
The secondary use of health data for research is becom-
ing increasingly important, and many countries are
developing policies aimed at facilitating such research,
sometimes under the banner of ‘big data’ [1, 2]. One of
the significant ethical and regulatory discussions in this
context is whether the initial registration of the data in
the clinical context and/or the later research use should
require informed consent from the data subject. The
arguments against a requirement for informed consent
to data collection and/or research use are strongest in
the case where the data collection is necessary for clinical
or administrative purposes, i.e. where the later research
use is really secondary to another primary purpose for
registration; and where the researchers only have access to
anonymous (person non-identifiable) data. If the data are
truly non-identifiable it can be argued 1) that there is no
risk of a harmful infringement of privacy by letting re-
searchers have access to the data, 2) that the persons in
question will not otherwise be harmed or have their
rights infringed by bona fide health research, 3) that we
all have an interest in health research taking place, 4)
that a requirement of explicit informed consent would
make research impossible; and that there are therefore
sufficient grounds for waiving the requirement for
informed consent [3–7].
In the following we present and analyse a case study
involving the Danish Circumcision Registry, which casts
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doubt on whether the standard argument for a waiver of
informed consent requirements can be extended to all
types of health registries and/or all kinds of research
using anonymised, secondary data only. We would like
to stress that the case of the circumcision registry serves
this illustrative purpose in relation to the debate on
harm, informed consent and health registries only. We
have a longstanding research interest in the secondary
use of health data, and this paper grows out of that
interest [8–13]. The focus of our analysis is not whether
a circumcision registry can be legitimate, but only
whether the establishment of such a registry may harm
individuals, and whether this creates a sufficient reason
for them to be given the possibility to refuse participa-
tion. We do not intend to enter into the general debate
on male childhood circumcision.1
Because our focus is informed consent in relation to the
use health data – and not circumcision per se – we
proceed from the de facto Danish legal position where
ritual circumcision is legal and parents can consent on be-
half of their children. They can consent to circumcision,
and if a question of consent arises in relation to the collec-
tion of health data from children, the parents are also the
proxy decision makers. Discussing if parents should have
these roles is outside the scope of this paper.
The Danish circumcision registry
Circumcision of male children is not routinely advocated
in Denmark, so such circumcisions are only performed
if there is a diagnosed medical problem, e.g. phimosis, or
for ritual/religious reasons. Circumcision can only legally
be performed by a doctor, or if a doctor is present. In an
official report from the Danish Board of Health it has
been estimated that there are approximately 15 Jewish
and between 1000 and 2000 Muslim ritual circumcisions
performed annually in Denmark.
Circumcisions of male children in hospitals have for
many years been registered in the National Patient
Registry (Landspatientregisteret), and this has allowed
some epidemiological research on the effect of circumci-
sion to take place [14]. But since the early 1990s only
circumcisions for medical reasons have been performed
in Danish public hospitals, since ritual circumcisions
have been excluded from coverage in the Danish health
care system due to resource constraints. Circumcisions
performed outside of hospital, whether or not medical
practitioners performed them, have not been registered,
and the indication for the circumcisions performed in
hospital (i.e. medical or ritual or possibly mixed) has
never been registered.
In 2013 the Danish Minister of Health decided to estab-
lish a new register aimed at collecting data about all ritual
male childhood circumcisions in Denmark. The main pur-
pose of the register was to make future research into the
consequences of ritual circumcision possible. In an inter-
view with a Danish newspaper the person administratively
responsible for the registry stated “We hope that the new
registry (…) will be able to qualify the debate on circumci-
sion. … we have previously not been able to follow up on
the potential health related complications following ritual
circumcision” [15]. An obligation to report all cases of
circumcision was imposed on the general practitioners
and practising specialists in a letter from the Ministry of
Health in late 2013 [16]. The doctors were required to re-
port the fact that a circumcision had taken place, that it
was a ritual circumcision, and the central personal registry
(CPR) number of the boy. The CPR number allows linkage
to a the vast number of comprehensive health and non-
health related registries in Denmark including the main
CPR register containing information about family rela-
tions and immigration status, The National Patient
Registry with information on diagnoses and medical
and surgical interventions undertaken at Danish Hospitals,
databases of educational attainment, employment status,
intelligence at the age of 18 (tested at military conscription)
and many other data sources. By linking circumcision to
the CPR number the registry would allow for subsequent
studies of potential medical and sexual complications
following medical and ritual circumcision. The linkage
would also allow future identification of and contact
with the circumcised boys and men for future research.
The circumcision registry did not register the specific
religion of the boys, but this can easily be deduced from
the timing of the circumcision, the name of the boy,
and the immigration status of the parents. Most Danish
health registries are run by the semi-independent pub-
lic institution SSI, and in early 2014 SSI began collect-
ing the data. The collection of data was halted by the
new Minister of Health in late July 2015 after it was
discovered that the registry did not have the necessary
permission to collect the data from the Danish Data
Protection Agency (Datatilsynet). In its decision the
agency would look at issues of the sensitivity of the data
collected, the justification for collecting sensitive data,
data security and formal (legal and administrative) as-
pects relating to the lines of responsibility for data
handling. The permission should have been acquired
before commencing the collection of data. Thus the
registry was in effect without legal foundation in its
19 months of operation under two different Ministers
of Health. It was expected that the registry would ob-
tain the required permission and be fully implemented
by the end of 2015, but in late 2015 the Ministry of
Health decided not to proceed with the registry. The
Danish Data Protection Agency never made a final
decision concerning the registry. In December 2016 the
Ministry of Health issued a regulation that requires
medical doctors to report all male circumcisions to the
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National Patient Registry (Landspatientregisteret) [17].
This will in practice create the same possibilities for
research into circumcision as a separate circumcision
registry.
In the following we will discuss four aspects of the
registry and its use as a basis for circumcision research.
We will argue that the establishment of the Danish
Circumcision Registry creates the possibility of harm to
those who are registered, and that specific features of
likely future research creates a situation where persons
might legitimately want to opt out of research. The five
aspects we analyse are:
1. Social pressure
2. Group stigmatization
3. Medicalization of a religious practice
4. Group discrimination
5. Potential bias in circumcision research as a
polarised research field
Our analysis of these five aspects support the conclusion
that in this specific instance potential research participants
have a strong and legitimate interest in deciding whether
or not their data should be collected and whether or not
data that have been collected should be used in research.
We will show that the use of anonymised registry data
can lead to harms in relation to 1–4 above, and that
each of these harms – if they are likely to occur – is suf-
ficient to challenge the assumption that anonymised data
can be used without consent. We will further show that
1 and 5 provide autonomy-based reasons to challenge
that assumption. By showing that these harms can arise in
relation to the use of anonymous data in our case-study
we aim to show that it is plausible that they can also arise
in other research projects based on anonymous registry
data. A general assumption that anonymisation is suffi-
cient to prevent harm and protect participants in registry-
based research is therefore false. It is therefore necessary
to analyse such research case by case. In specific cases we
may find that even though there is identifiable harm to
participants, research should still be conducted because it
is justified by other important considerations. This, of
course, does not add any support to the ‘no harm if anon-
ymised’ assumption prevalent in the literature. It simply
shows that we may have overriding reasons.
Discussion
The problem of overreaching social pressure
Schoeman in his seminal work on privacy and social
freedom directs attention to the simple mechanism that
societies make use of social pressure in order to effect-
ively promote certain beliefs and values and thereby
secure the continued existence of these societies [18].
Through enforcement mechanisms such as community
inclusion or exclusion, and various forms of social grada-
tions involving honour and shame, a society can put
pressure on its members in order to secure direction
and effectiveness in the promotion and implementation
in action of certain beliefs and values that are constitu-
tive of the relevant group of people. In other words
social pressure is sometimes necessary to establish a
conformity in certain beliefs, values and actions required
for the continued existence of a group. Social pressure
can, however, sometimes and in some forms become
overreaching. That happens when the social pressure
towards conformity in beliefs and values makes it impos-
sible for individuals to express and develop their individ-
ual identity. Or, in Schoeman’s words, when the social
pressure threatens self-expression and self-development.
Self-expression and self-development may take various
forms, but what is characteristic of both self-expression
and self-development is that they engage a person dis-
tinctively and they engage a person comprehensively
[18]. To somehow express “this is who I am” or “this is
who I want to be” is an emotional, cognitive, spiritual
and moral engaging act establishing a distinctive individ-
ual identity. Social pressure threatens self-expression
and self-development by striving towards conformity in
beliefs and values. By enforcing beliefs and values upon
an individual social pressure may not only cause the
erosion of the distinctive self through a process whereby
beliefs and values constitutive of the self are substituted
by beliefs and values constitutive of a group. By enforcing
beliefs and values upon an individual social pressure also
restricts the freedom to engage emotionally, cognitively,
spiritually and morally in the formation of the self. If self-
expression and self-development are to be protected from
overreaching social pressure, Schoeman contends, we
have to restrict the scope of social pressure as such. This
protection may be achieved through granting an individ-
ual a social space with freedom from social pressure – a
space of privacy. Privacy protects a person against social
pressure threatening self-expression. Privacy, defined as
restrictions on the physical/observational and informa-
tional access to a person, thus limits the access to those
beliefs, values, emotions, habits and other traits that
may become the target of social pressure and attempt
of social control. This conception of privacy clearly
implies that the plausibility of a claim to privacy is
relative to contexts where there is a risk of social pressure
undermining self-expression.
In a wider ethical perspective, the exercise of social
control threatens personal autonomy. Personal auton-
omy may be defined in various ways. Minimally, it may
be taken to imply a right to act on preferences that one
endorses or at least does not resist without being unduly
influenced by others [19, 20]. Social pressure aimed at
‘enforcing’ beliefs and values on the individual seems to
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leave little room for the individual to endorse or decide
not to resist these beliefs and preferences without undue
influence. Without going into further details let us sim-
ply note that Schoeman’s particular insight is that social
pressure may violate something more fundamental than
autonomy; it may violate self-expression and self-
development as a comprehensive emotional, cognitive,
spiritual and moral enterprise. However, self-expression
and self-development are clearly forming and acting on
preferences that are endorsed by the individual.
There seems to be little doubt that practicing religion
in general must be considered an act of self-expression.
Religiosity engages the self distinctively and comprehen-
sively. It engages a person cognitively and morally
through the formation and justification of beliefs and
values but it also engages peoples’ innermost emotions
and lead people to form social ties with others of the
same belief and partake in various activities of a ritual
character [21, 22]. At the same time, religious beliefs are
strongly contested in today’s society. They are claimed
to be unscientific and irrational, but also to lead to
oppression and to be inhuman in various ways [23, 24].
In short, religiosity is a particularly strong form of self-
expression with particular potential for becoming the
object of social pressure in current societies.
The establishing of a circumcision registry in itself
may exercise unacceptable social pressure on religious
groups. Establishing the registry has important symbolic
effects in that it marks the practice of ritual circumcision
as a potential problem that needs investigation, and
thereby denormalises the practice. Furthermore, the
establishment of the registry is not an isolated event, but
an aspect of an ongoing development. A number of
Danish medical associations including the Danish
Medical Association, the Danish College of General
Practitioners, the Danish Surgical Society, and the Danish
Paediatric Society have all come out against circumcision
unless there is a medical indication [25, 26]. Parents who
choose circumcision for religious reasons are thus under
suspicion of causing complications to the health of their
children, and this creates pressure to critically evaluate
their religious practices and potentially give them up.
One may think this pressure justified because circum-
cision runs counter to some of our most strongly held
ethical principles and values, e.g. to avoid causing harm
to and mutilation of another person and to secure a
valid informed consent before interventions [27–30].
Note very importantly, however, that there is a more
general social pressure that is also exercised by such
registries, and that is pressure against religiosity as such.
Thus the very existence of a public registry with informa-
tion on peoples’ religious practices may come to affect
these practices through general awareness and perhaps
even fear of the possibility that the State – public and
private researchers – may make one as a religious person
the object of not only research but also administrative
investigations, but also through fear that one’s religious
beliefs may come to play a role for one’s future rights and
opportunities in society. That is, the existence of such a
registry not only exercises social pressure on the practice
of ritual circumcision, but also on religiosity as such.
We are not claiming that unacceptable levels of social
pressure will inevitably follow in the wake of establishing a
circumcision registry. We are only claiming that establish-
ing a circumcision registry may impact the experienced
pressure of the individual, and thus in turn threaten self-
expression and self-development related to religious prac-
tices. The pressure may infringe self-determination and it
may cause harm. This means that the individual has legit-
imate grounds for resisting both registration and research.
More speculatively the establishment of the circumcision
registry and the future research use may support
stigmatization of the practice of circumcision and those
groups in society that practice it.
The problem of stigmatization
In Erving Goffmans classic interpretation stigmatization is
a matter of making a person seem inferior, dangerous and
even something less than human by means of attributing
the person with a trait that is discreditable to a degree that
will result in discrimination. Building on this interpret-
ation, it has been suggested that stigmatization has five
constituents [31]. First, the identification and labelling of a
difference between people. Second, the association of the
relevant difference with negative stereotypes. Third, the
segregation of individuals into “us”, the labellers,
and “them”, the labelled. Fourth, diminished social status
and discrimination. Fifth, an asymmetrical distribution of
social, economic and political power that allows for the
labelling party to produce segregation and discrimination.
According to this theory all five elements are necessary in
order for stigmatization to be the case. Several of the
elements may, however, vary in degree, and hence strength
of stigmatization may vary.
Stigmatization by definition raises ethical issues [9, 32].
Thus the negative stereotyping involved in stigmatization
is degrading and dehumanising in nature. It operates by
pointing to traits that are seen as deviant and/or shameful,
and ultimately, in Goffman’s theory, it involves portraying
a person as less worthy than others. As such stigmatization
may be claimed to violate a requirement to respect the
dignity of others [33]. Stigmatization also per definition
involves segregation and discrimination. Finally, there is
evidence indicating that stigmatization may cause various
psychological harms such as lowered self-esteem, anxiety,
depression, and distrust in others [34, 35].
Establishing a registry on ritual or religious circumcision
may result in or add to an already existing stigmatization
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of groups practising circumcision and on religious groups
in particular. First, the practice of circumcision is a
marked difference between groups in society. In the
Danish context circumcision is primarily – if not ex-
clusively – practiced in religious contexts, i.e. specific-
ally in and by the Jewish and Muslim communities.
Hence, the difference between the practitioners and
non-practitioners is easy to identify and label.
In the Danish public debate circumcision is – partly
informed by scientific evidence – claimed to cause vari-
ous forms of harm to defenceless children ranging from
pain during the procedure to complications of sexual life
and autism in later life [14, 36–38]. Moreover, circumci-
sion is argued to be a type of intervention that requires
a valid informed consent from the patient. This implies
that circumcision before the child acquires the compe-
tence to consent is a violation of autonomy and of the hu-
man rights of the child [39–42]. Thus, strongly present in
public discourse is the view that circumcision poses a
threat to fundamental values of western societies – it is
seen and depicted as inhumane practices. A recent opin-
ion poll shows that 74% of the Danish population think
that childhood circumcision should be prohibited [43].
Since circumcision in Denmark is prohibited unless per-
formed by or in the presence of a medical doctor, potential
evidence for more complications following ritual or
religious circumcision also raises the question if ritual or
religious circumcisions are always conducted in conform-
ity with the law. Suspicion of systematic, institutionalised
failure to abide by the law may obviously also add to the
perceived danger posed by these groups. The public
discourse presents circumcision as an inhumane practice,
and the establishing of the circumcision registry throws
suspicion on religious groups. These are acts of negative
stereotyping.
Segregation defined as a separation of individuals into
more or less well-defined groups of people labelling and
being labelled is already happening in Denmark. The cir-
cumcision debate is inextricably linked to debates about
the role of especially Muslim immigrants in Danish
Society [44, 45]. Establishing a circumcision registry
where Muslim boys will be the main group of data sub-
jects potentially makes the Danish public authorities
complicit in this labelling of Muslims as deviant.
Whether the general public discourse on circumci-
sion or the specific act of establishing a circumcision
registry has or will result in various forms of dis-
crimination in public life is difficult to predict. It is
worth noting, however, that the lack of attention to
obtaining the required permission from the Danish
Data Protection Agency before starting data collec-
tion already indicates a lack of interest in the rights
of the future data subjects that may be classified as
discriminatory.
The asymmetric distribution of power that allows for
the labelling party to produce segregation and discrimin-
ation is evident in the case of the circumcision. As de-
scribed above medical societies has taken a stand in the
general public debate on circumcision, and the establish-
ment of the registry was ordered by the Minister of
Health with the backing of scientific experts. This shows
a coming together of expert, professional and political
power in this case.
We believe, that all of the above considerations
make it likely that circumcised people may already
suffer stigmatization to a certain extent but that this
stigmatization may be intensified and more strongly
directed at religious people by the establishing of the cir-
cumcision registry. We do not claim that stigmatization
will inevitably follow. Our argument is simply that the
mere risk of stigmatization provides an individual
with a legitimate reason not to be part of the registry
or participate in any future research.
The problem of medicalization
Zola introduced the concept of medicalization in order
to describe the phenomenon of medical concepts being
applied to an increasing number of everyday activities.
By describing everyday activities in categories of illnesses
or in terms of effects on health, these activities become
of relevance for the medical profession and may be sub-
jected to medical interventions. As such medicine may
increase its role as an institution that exercise social
control [46, 47]. The concept of medicalization has also
been used to describe a related phenomenon, namely
the tendency of people to look at everyday activities
from the perspective of medicine. Medicalization in this
sense refers to a subtle conceptual change in peoples’ in-
terpretation of events whereby they come to describe
events and activities in medical terms [48]. That is, they
come to view events or activities in light of the possible
effect they may have on their health.
The concept of medicalization has been applied by a
number of authors to routine neonatal circumcision as
practiced in the USA, [49, 50] and Szasz analysed this
practice as one of the many examples of interventions
legitimized by the Therapeutic State defined as “…the
political order in which social controls are legitimized by
the ideology of health” [51].
The ethics of medicalization is complex and cannot be
treated exhaustively here [48, 52]. Two general features
of medicalization in the latter sense introduced above,
however, may make medicalization an ethical problem.
First, that the medicalization of events and activities may
generate new worries about the future. Viewing events
and activities from the perspective of medicine often – if
not always – involves identifying and assessing risks to
one’s health and wellbeing, and the awareness of such
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threats may obviously deprive these everyday activities
of their pleasure and create new worries. In the case of
ritual circumcision medicalization may, for instance en-
gender new worries about sexual function and pleasure.
This is obviously a harm to the person in question since
circumcision is, for all intents and purposes, an irrevers-
ible procedure. Second, there is a further reason to con-
sider medicalization an ethical problem and thus also for
the individual to resist medicalization of events and
activities, and that is the change in meaning and value
per definition involved in the medicalization of events
and activities. Medicalization in the latter sense is a
matter of people changing their view on things – it is a
matter of changing outlook or perspective. Everyday
events and activities changes from being endowed with
meaning and value independent of the medical context
to be events and activities inscribed in a medical frame-
work of meaning and value. Events and activities are
interpreted in light of their influence on health and
associated with value accordingly.
We believe that establishing a circumcision registry
with the purpose of studying potential complications fol-
lowing religious circumcision is likely to lead to or at
least further the medicalization of circumcision as reli-
gious practice, and that it may undermine the religious
meaning and value of these activities. One may obviously
for various reasons hold the view that such effects are
justified because circumcision runs counter to some of
our most strongly held ethical principles and values.
Note, however, that reasons for prohibiting circumcision
or religious circumcision are not necessarily reasons for
medicalization.
It is important to once again note, that we do not
claim that medicalization of circumcision as a religious
practice will inevitable happen but only that it is likely
to be reinforced by establishing of the circumcision
registry, and that, most importantly, the possibility of
the medicalization of circumcision as a religious practice
provides the individual with a reason not to participate
in research.
The problem of discrimination
Apart from the discrimination of individuals in public
life conceptually tied to stigmatization, the circumcision
registry raises a wider issue of discrimination independ-
ent of stigmatization. Let us define discrimination as
involving acts and practices that confer harm upon a
group of people by treating them differently from rele-
vantly similar groups in society. The very existence of
the circumcision registry may be claimed to be discrim-
inatory in this sense because 1) it singles out a minority
cultural practice for monitoring of and research into the
associated risks among a number of practices associated
with relevantly similar risks, and 2) the singling out of
this practice may confer the harms of stigmatization and
medicalization on group members. Given that we have
already argued in favour of 2) let us briefly consider 1).
Many minority and majority cultural practices may be
claimed to be associated with risks relevantly similar to
those of circumcision. Participation in many sports cre-
ate a predictable risk of, sometimes permanent physical
harm, as does a wide range of other leisure activities,
dietary customs etc. Not establishing registries for these
practices, while establishing a circumcision registry
could therefore be claimed to be inequitable and dis-
criminatory. The inequitability point does, however, cut
both ways because it can also be claimed that those par-
ticipating in these other activities have a claim that their
problems should be investigated.
It also has to be taken into account that the establish-
ing of the circumcision registry or any other condition
or intervention specific registry is the outcome of a com-
plex political process involving many actors and interests
including those of the public, politicians, researchers,
research institutions and organisations. A registry is
unlikely to be established unless the condition or inter-
vention is perceived as a significant problem by the rele-
vant decision makers since the establishment of a
registry requires the expenditure of both political and
financial capital, and therefore a decision about how to
use and allocate finite resources. The mere fact that
there is a registry for one condition or intervention and
not for another with the same risk profile is therefore
not sufficient to make out a claim of discrimination.
Such processes may furthermore lead to decisions on re-
search priorities that are discriminatory in the specified
sense without this being intentional.
However, given that the circumcision registry can
reasonably be seen to be discriminatory in nature and
because of its stated purpose, we believe it provides an
individual with a legitimate reason not to be part of the
registry or participate in any future research.
The problem of polarised research
Polarisation of a scientific community in a given field of
research obtains when scientists holding radically op-
posed views are split into groups partly constituted by
the opposition to other groups in the field, where this
opposition concerns 1) scientific findings and methods,
and/or 2) policy advice on the basis of scientific findings
[53]. Polarisation may result in the researchers choosing
their methods, reporting their findings and offering
policy advice with the main aim of promoting the views
of their community rather than to advance objective
science and provide unbiased advice [53]. In that case
we have a conflict of interest between, on the one hand,
the general interest of science and the interests of the
public and political decision-makers in objective and
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unbiased science, and, on the other hand, the particular
interest of polarised researchers in preserving and advan-
cing the view of a community [54–57]. The polarisation of
a scientific community may happen unintentionally. That
is, researchers may be honestly convinced of the truth of
their views but still act in ways contributing to the
polarisation of a scientific community in a given field.
The circumcision research field is polarised to a sig-
nificant degree. Many researchers studying the effects of
childhood circumcision also have strong views about
whether circumcision should be promoted, or prohib-
ited. Potential participants in such research arguably
have an interest, and putative right, to determine for
themselves not only what harms and risks they are
willing to expose themselves to in the name of research,
but also what kind of research agenda, and which re-
searchers, they wish to align themselves with. For some,
a factor in this decision will be the perceived trust-
worthiness, credibility and scientific objectivity of the re-
searchers involved. To use an analogy, an atheist parent
who believes their child’s science teacher was a devout
creationist would have a legitimate reason to ask ques-
tions about the objectivity of the teaching and seek re-
assurance about what is being taught and how the
teacher manages the conflict between their personal
beliefs and the curriculum they must teach. Similarly, a
potential participant (who supported circumcision) in a
study being run by a researcher who was an outspoken
opponent of circumcision has a legitimate reason to ask
questions about the objectivity of the study and seek re-
assurance about how the data is used and interpreted.
There may be a perceived conflict of interest between
the perceived opposition to circumcision and the ability
to independently and objectively evaluate and interpret
evidence about its safety, and this provides a person with
a legitimate reason to refuse to take part in the research.
As such the conflict of interest generated by the polar-
isation of research is similar to other conflicts of interest.
We routinely require informed consent documents to
state the funding source for the research, and would
not find it inappropriate for someone to decline par-
ticipation because of a particular funding source. And,
like with other conflicts of interest discussions, the
premise that needs to be substantiated is not that the
conflict of interest will necessarily lead to bias, but
only that the conflict of interest may lead to bias. This
is the understanding of conflict of interest of the
International Council of Medical Journal Editors
(ICMJE). In their ‘Form for Disclosure of Potential
Conflicts of Interest’ section 5 requires authors to ‘re-
port other relationships or activities that readers could
perceive to have influenced, or that give the appear-
ance of potentially influencing, what you wrote in the
submitted work’ [58].
Implications – informed consent as a minimal
requirement
In the preceding sections we have argued that the case of
the Danish Circumcision Registry illustrates registry-based
research that may lead to problematic forms of social
pressure, stigmatization, medicalization, discrimination,
and that there may be significant conflicts of interest
involved. How do we protect the individual against
such risks?
Maximal protection of the individual would require, it
seems, a prohibition against the establishing of such
registries and the research into such registries. If we
somehow knew that a registry was established with the
purpose of forming the basis for social pressure,
stigmatization, and discrimination; or if we knew that a
research project had such a purpose, we would have a
compelling reason to prohibit the establishment of the
registry or the conduct of the research [59]. The mere
fact that most or all participants had provided consent
would not in itself make the registry or the research
legitimate. In the absence of such knowledge this con-
clusion, however, does not follow. And, it also ignores
the positive reasons for conducting research of this kind.
After all the research may eventually come to benefit
people. And, even if we maintain that the benefits may
not always be sufficient to outweigh the costs of the kind
described in this paper, it seems that at least sometimes
an adequate analysis of this can only be performed retro-
spectively, i.e. after the research in such registries has
been conducted. There is also an argument that only a
complete database can form the basis for certain kinds
of research. This is an important consideration that has to
be weighed against other concerns. Add to that, that we
have so far only argued that there is risk of unacceptable
forms of social pressure, stigmatization, medicalization,
discrimination and of negative consequences of polarisa-
tion – not that any of these negative effects will inevitably
follow. It seems that we have little ground for ruling out
such research entirely.
How then do we ensure then the protection of the indi-
vidual against the risks associated with this kind of
registry-based research? One answer is by requiring in-
formed consent. The requirement of informed consent
provides the individual with the opportunity to weigh the
reasons for and against participation in registry-based
research of the relevant kind, and on this basis provide or
refuse consent. We take each of the potential negative as-
pects – unacceptable social pressure, stigmatization,
medicalization, discrimination and biased research – to be
sufficient for a requirement of informed consent in a
context where they are not only theoretical risks, but have
some practical likelihood of actually eventuating.
Several objections may be raised here. First, it could
perhaps be argued that we have zeroed in on the single
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black swan in registry-based research. Most of the current
registry-based research does not involve registries and
does not have purposes that are likely to have effects simi-
lar to that of a ritual circumcision registry, and therefore a
general requirement of informed consent would simply be
overkill. We believe this objection rests on a too narrow
understanding of the triggers of the described problems.
To widen the picture, we believe that many forms of re-
search into registries based on data about, for instance,
psychiatric disorders, sexually transmitted diseases,
ethnicity, and so on, may lead to problematic forms of
social pressure, stigmatization, medicalization, and discrim-
ination. And, the problem of polarisation and biased re-
search following from polarisation may happen in any field
of research.
Second, one may object that there are alternative ways
of protecting the individual. The individual may be pro-
tected through anonymization or through a requirement
of registry-based research being approved by a research
ethics committee. None of these suggestions provide ad-
equate protection of the individual. Thus an individual
will not enjoy sufficient protection by simply being
anonymised, i.e. by being made non-identifiable. The
individual may experience all the negative effects of
research using a circumcision registry in spite of being
anonymous to the researcher and anybody else. And the
legitimate interest in not participating in potentially
biased research can never be protected by anonymiza-
tion. Neither will it provide sufficient protection of the
individual to require a research ethics committee to
evaluate the risks to the individual. It is not clear that
an ethics committee will be able to detect and ad-
equately evaluate the impact on the individual level of
the harms potentially suffered from this kind of re-
search. Of all the suggested harms – social pressure,
stigmatization, medicalization, and discrimination – it
holds that they are highly relative to the individual,
i.e. individuals may react and experience these effects
very differently. What perspective should the research
ethics committee in its evaluation of risks and impacts,
the ‘objective view’ of an equanimeous ethnic Danish
citizen, or the ‘subjective view’ of a young Muslim man
entered into the registry when he was a boy?
Third, one may perhaps make the following “what if”
objection: What if the data on religious or ritual circum-
cision had been routinely collected in the health sector,
so that the research into the complications following cir-
cumcision would not require the establishing of a new
registry, but merely secondary use of data collected for
good clinical or administrative research. Would it not
have been legitimate to conduct the research without
consent in such circumstances? We believe that there is
little, if any, ground for distinguishing between the
existence of the circumcision registry and research on
religious circumcision in the arguments we have advanced.
Thus we believe that unacceptable forms of social pressure,
stigmatization, the negative effects of medicalization, and
biased research may result from research on religious
circumcision regardless of the exact way in which the
underlying information is originally recorded.
Fourth, one may object that the practical difficulties
facing an attempt to obtain informed consent – even if
the requirement is somehow restricted to registry-based
research projects identified as particularly likely to have
the described negative effects – are insurmountable.
With today’s technological advancements, we believe, it
is possible to find easy and flexible ways of obtaining in-
formed consent using emails, applications for smart-
phones, or platforms on the Internet. More importantly,
however, a requirement of informed consent does not
necessarily have to imply a requirement to obtain informed
consent for every possible use of personal data (12). A
recent model of consent – meta consent [8, 13, 60] – sug-
gests that individuals should be offered the opportunity to
design future consent requests for themselves. That is, they
should be asked how they would like to provide consent
for future use of their health data in research and then
given the opportunity to provide an answer using prede-
fined types of consent on predefined types of data. More
specifically, it should be possible for an individual to design
future consent requests on the basis of types of consent
such as:
1) ‘Consent for every use of data’,
2) ‘Consent for broader categories of research on data’,
3) ‘Consent for all research’,
4) ‘Refuse consent to all research’
And for types of data such as e.g.:
A) ‘Electronic Patient Record’ (EPR),
B) ‘Data in health related registries’,
C) ‘Data in non-health related registries’,
D) ‘Biological material’.
The four types of consent may all replace ‘X’ and the
four types of data may all replace ‘Y’ in the following state-
ment expressing a consent request: ‘In relation to the
future research use of my Y, I wish to be asked for/wish to
X’. The resulting consent requests for each individual for
the four types of data (A1–4, B1–4, C1–4, D1–4) consti-
tute a meta consent and should be recorded in an official
database from which researchers can then automatically
generate consent requests based on an individual’s
preferences.
Assuming that many individuals would have a high
degree of trust in public research institutions and
researchers in general and therefore provide a blanket
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consent for future use of most data, i.e. resulting in a meta
consent with the following ordering [A3, B3, C3, D3], an
IT based implementation of such a model would imply
that less practical difficulties would be faced within a
specific research project than models of informed consent
requiring a informed consent from every individual for
every research project regardless of an individual’s own
preference for how and when to provide consent.
Conclusion
We have in this article argued that potential research
participants may have a strong and legitimate interest in
deciding whether or not their data should be collected
and used for registry-based research such as, for in-
stance, research based on the Danish Circumcision
Registry. It is important to note that we have not argued
against establishing such registries although some of our
considerations could be used in such arguments. It is
equally important to note that we have not argued for or
against circumcision or ritual circumcision. We have
only used the case of the Danish Circumcision Registry
to illustrate more general points about research based
on secondary use of health and other data.
Endnote
1In the following ‘circumcision’ should be read as ‘male
childhood circumcision’ except when explicitly qualified.
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